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THE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
AMENDMENTS ACT: AN OVERVIEW
Deborah M. Mostaghel*

INTRODUCTION

If nuclear power was once the goose that laid the golden egg, nuclear waste is now an egg that nobody wants to hatch. Hospi'tals,
universities, and manufacturers, as well as nuclear power plants, annually produce vast quantities of waste contaminated with varying
levels of radioactivity. For years the generators of this waste simply
burned their refuse, dumped it in streams, or stored it in underground trenches or metal drums.! The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 2
allowed private industry to participate in developing atomic energy
for peaceful purposes but did not regulate the disposal of civilian
nuclear wastes. s This failure had a significant impact, as such waste
is dangerous for a period longer than most human institutions themselves endure. 4 Legislative attempts to compel safe disposal of waste
illustrate the dilemmas of federalism which must be resolved to ensure that safe disposal becomes a reality. Congress's first attempt,
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act ("LLRWPA" or
"Original Act") of 1980,11 enabled states to exercise some control
• Instructor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D. 1988, The University of
Utah.
\. Irvin L. White & John P. Spath, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: How Are States
Setting Their Sites? ENv'T, Oct. 1984, at 16, 20.
2. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755, amended by Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2011-2296
(1988)).
.
3. See S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6933,
6934.
4. The ecology, soil chemistry, hydrology, geology, climate, and meteorology of sites in which to
bury low-level radioactive waste must be evaluated for at least a 500-year period. Such a long
time span is necessary because it is only after 500 years that the remaining radioactivity no longer
poses "an unacceptable hazard to an intruder or public health and safety." 10 C.F.R.
§ 6\.7(b)(5) (1991).
5. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96·573, 94 Stat. 3347, 3348
(repealed 1986). Low-level radioactive waste consists of "material which has been contaminated
by radioactive elements or radionuclides. Low-level radioactive waste is often defined by what it is
not. It is not spent reactor fuel, wastes from reprocessed reactor fuel, uranium mine and mill
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over the disposal of low-level nuclear waste. The LLRWPA authorized states to form regional compacts to choose sites for and license
regional disposal facilities. 6 In 1986, Congress amended the
LLRWPA, enacting the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act ("LLRWPAA" or "Amendments").' The
LLRWPAA supplemented the 1980 Act by providing additional
deadlines and monetary incentives for compliance. 8 Nine regional
compacts have subsequently been formed under the auspices of the
Act and its Amendments. 9 Each compact has made some progress
toward selecting a host state 10 and some host states have started the
lengthy and emotionally-charged process of site selection.
The impetus for such progress was interrupted, however, as states
waited for the outcome of New York's constitutional challenge to
the Amendments in the Supreme Court. l l New York, which had
opted not to join a compact, challenged the constitutionality of the
1985 Amendments on the grounds that the incentives it provided
violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, as well as several
other Constitutional provisions. 12 But while New York's challenge
succeeded with regard to one provision,13 the remainder of the Act
was upheld and remains in force.
This paper, answering questions raised in an earlier article,14 first
sets out the events and policies that led to the enactment of the
federal law and amendments that authorize state-organized regional
tailings or items contaminated with specified levels of transuranic elements." H.R. REP. No. 314,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at IS (1985). Congress has yet to develop a workable solution to the
problem presented by disposal of high-level nuclear wastes, those generated in the reprocessing of
nuclear fuel, and others so classified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 10101(12) (1988); 10 C.F.R. § 61.2 (1993).
6. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at 3348.
7. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99
Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988»).
8. /d. § 2021e.
9. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2416 (1992).
10. Since a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility's life expectancy is between 20 to 50
years, a new facility should be developed while the old one is operating. Most compacts require
that a member state which has not yet served as a host state develop the new site. See U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY. OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. PERSPECTIVES: Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT 2 (1989).
II. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (striking down the take-title provision contained in the Amendments).
12. /d.; see also infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text (discussing New York's challenge to
the statute).
13. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
14. Deborah M. Mostaghel, Who Regulates the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act? 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'y 73 (1988).
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radioactive waste disposal. After analyzing what the amended statute requires, it examines the states' progress in forming and siting
compacts. This article also considers the effects of state challenges
to the Act and its Amendments. Finally, the conclusion notes problem areas that should be addressed with regard to nuclear waste
disposal.

I.

EVENTS AND POLICIES LEADING TO ENACTMENT OF THE
LLR WPA AND THE LLRWPAA

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed so soon after the end
of World War II that atomic energy was "popularly associated only
with the atom bomb . . . ."111 The role of private industry in developing atomic power was very restricted, as "the manufacture and
use of atomic materials [was] a Government monopoly."16 The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("AEA")17 advocated a broader role
for private industry, fostering a partnership between the private sector and the government to develop peaceful uses for atomic energy
"to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and
security and with the health and safety of the public . . . ."18
The AEA, however, does not explicitly provide for the disposal of
radioactive waste. Rather, the AEA generally states that nuclear facilities and materials should be regulated to protect the health and
safety of the public. 19 While states have traditionally enacted protective legislation in the areas of health, safety, and public welfare
pursuant to their police power, states can regulate only those areas
that are not preempted by federal legislation. 20 States may, for example, regulate railroads and highways,21 and they may also award
public utility franchises. 22 With narrow restrictions, a few states
15. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.s.C.C.A.N. 3456,
3457.
16. [d. at 3458.
17. Pub. L. No. 83·703,68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1988».
18. [d. § 2013(d).
19. [d. § 2012(e).
20. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6, at 401-545 (2d
ed. 1988) (examining federalism-based limitations on state and local power).
21. See. e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
(allowing states to regulate the weight and width of vehicles that use their roads and railways as
long as the regulations are intended to promote public safety objectives and not to benefit local
economic interests).
22. See, e.g.. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he franchise to operate a pub·
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may even regulate certain safety aspects of nuclear power. Section
274 of the AEA gives limited regulatory power to those states and
authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") - and its successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")23 - to enter
into agreements with the individual states. 24 It also permits these socalled "agreement states" to assume authority to license and regulate (1) byproduct material,211 (2) source material,26 and (3) small
quantities of special nuclear material. 27 Under this program, states
may regulate those AEA licensees within their borders that use byproduct, source, and special nuclear material. The agreement states
may also agree to be responsible for regulating some radiological
safety hazards. 28
States first began trying to regulate the safety of nuclear power
lic utility . . . is a special privilege which . . . may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the
State.") (quoting Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1929».
23. The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished on October II, 1974. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 104(a), 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 5814(a) (1988». The Energy Reorganization Act also established the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which was given authority to implement the Atomic Energy Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5841-49 (1988).
24. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274b, 73 Stat. 688 (1959) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 2021 b(l988». This 1959 Act, which amended the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, authorized the NRC to enter into agreements with any state and discontinued the NRC's
regulatory authority with respect to byproduct materials, source materials, and special nuclear
materials within the state.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b (1988). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 defines "by-product material"
as:
(I) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing
special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or
concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source
material content.
[d. § 2014(e).
26. "Source material" is defined as:
(I) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission
pursuant to the provisions of section 2091 of this title to be source material; or (2)
ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the
Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.
[d. § 2014(z).
27. "Special nuclear material" is defined as:
(I) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any
other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 2071 of
this title, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not
include source material.
[d. § 2014(aa).
28. [d. § 2021 b.
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plants during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 29 Until 1983, however,
case law held that the tone of the statute and its legislative history
evidenced Congress's implied preemption of state regulation of nuclear plants. 3o In Northern States Power Company v. Minnesota,31
Northern had received a state operating permit requiring it to regulate radioactive discharges using more stringent criteria than those
provided by the AEA.32 Northern filed suit, alleging that federal
regulations under the AEA preempted Minnesota's authority to regulate discharges from power plants. 33 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed, concluding that state regulation of nuclear power could conflict with Congress's intention that
the AEA encourage the rapid growth of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes. 34 In a similar setback for state regulation, the Seventh
Circuit in 1982 held that the NRC has exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards. 311 Finally, that same year the Ninth Circuit
held that the federal government had reserved for itself the safety
regulation of nuclear power. 36
Unlike states such as Minnesota, Illinois, and Washington, California successfully navigated the preemption waters by passing laws
29. See. e.g.. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, Ch.
276, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 501 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-980 (West
1986 & Supp. 1993)); Spent Nuclear Fuel Act, P.A. 81-1516, 1980 Ill. Laws 3905 (codified as
amended at 420 ILCS §§ 15/0.01-15/4 (1993)); Act of Feb. 12, 1967, Ch. 108, §§ 4,6,8-9,
1967 Mont. Laws 188, 191, 192, 194-95 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-3-101
to -405 (1993)).
30. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1149-53 (8th Cir. 1971), affd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). The Supreme Court's affirmance of Northern States would seem to
suggest that other state laws attempting to regulate the safety of nuclear power plants would be
struck down. But see infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's response to the
Northern States decision).
31. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1149-53.
32. [d. at 1145.
33. [d.
34. [d. at 1153 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-12 (1988». Congress effectively overruled Northern
States by passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(codified as amended at 42 U.s.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). These amendments
give the states the authority to regulate commercial nuclear facilities and materials. A state may
regulate radioactive air pollutants from such facilities once the state's procedures are approved by
the Environmental Protection Agency. [d. § 7412(1)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
35. Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 215 (7th Cir. 1982).
36. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1982) (striking down a voter-approved initiative that would have prohibited the state from either
receiving or storing radioactive waste produced outside the state). The Court of Appeals concluded that Washington's use of its police power to protect the health and safety of its citizens
contravened the federal government's power to regulate the safety of nuclear power reserved to it
by the AEA. [d. at 630-32.
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addressing economic rather than safety concerns. 37 California's nuclear laws 38 took advantage of the fact that, while the federal government ensures the safety of nuclear power, the states generate and
sell electricity.39 Under California law, new reactors cannot be certified by the state until a technology to dispose of high-level nuclear
waste is both identified and approved by the federal government. 40
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,4~ a utility, Pacific Gas & Electric
Company ("PG&E"), sought a declaratory judgment that federal
regulation of nuclear power preempted California's laws. The district court held in favor of PG&E,42 but on appeal the Ninth Circuit
rejected PG&E's argument that Northern States was controlling. 43
The Court of Appeals upheld the California laws because it found
California was exercising its traditional police power by basing the
laws on economic factors. 44 On final appeal, the Supreme Court
held that California's laws were motivated by economic rather than
safety concerns and that the state law therefore did not conflict with
the federal purpose of developing nuclear energy as expressed in the
AEA.4~ This suggests that as long as states regulate the economic
rather than the safety aspects of nuclear power, state laws will not
conflict with the goals of the AEA.
37. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & .Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 205 (1983). In holding that § 25524.2 of the California Public Resources Code was not
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, the Court stated:
Congress, in passing the 1954 [Atomic Energy] Act . . . intended that the Federal
Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, but that the States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of
need, reliability, cost, and other related state concerns.
Jd.
38. California's nuclear laws are part of the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-980 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
39. Pacific Gas. 461 U.S. at 194.
40. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.1 (West 1986).
41. 461 U.s. 190 (1983).
42. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489
F.Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
43. The Pacific Legal Foundation also challenged California's law. See Pacific Legal Found. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd
and rem'd. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), affd, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). The case was consolidated
with Pacific Gas on appeal, where the Ninth Circuit remanded Pacific Legal Foundation on the
grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing. Pacific Legal Found., 659 F.2d at 913-14, 928.
44. Pacific Legal Found.. 659 F.2d at 923-25.
45. Pacific Gas. 461 U.S. at 212, 216, 219.

1994]

RADIOACTIVE WASTE

385

At the federal level, problems at disposal sites in the 1970s forced
Congress to rethink the issue of safety regulation in the area of nuclear waste disposal. From 1962 to 1971, the AEC licensed six commercial regional disposal sites for low-level radioactive wastes,"6 By
1978, however, three of the sites were closed due to groundwater
pooling in the trenches used to bury the waste'" Moreover, improper waste packaging and transportation caused Washington and
Nevada to temporarily close the sites located in their states in
1979. 48 That same year, Governor Richard Riley of South Carolina
announced that the Barnwell site would reduce by half the volume
of waste it was accepting no later than October 31, 1981"9
Rather than passing a law dealing with waste disposal, however,
Congress, "at the states' request, and in the interest of federalism,
deferred action to allow the formulation of state-based and statecreated proposals."llo The states wanted a state-created plan for various reasons. The three states with existing disposal facilities worried that a plan created without their input could force their sites to
become permanent repositories. 1l1 There is also some indication that
other states were dissatisfied with management at existing federal
sites. 1l2 In addition, all the states wanted to be able to choose disposal sites, rather than have them imposed by the federal govern46. Those sites were Beatty, Nevada, 1962; Maxey Flats, Kentucky, 1963; West Valley, New
York, 1963; Richland, Washington, 1965; Sheffield, Illiriois, 1967; and Barnwell, South Carolina,
1971. White & Spath, supra note I, at 16, 20.
47. The site at West Valley, New York was closed in 1975. In 1977, the site at Maxey Flats,
Kentucky stopped operating and the site at Sheffield, Illinois shut down in 1978. Id. at 16, 36.
48. H.R. REP. No. 314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 17 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3006.
49. Gary W. Hart & Keith R. Glaser, A Failure to Enact: A Review of Radioactive Waste
Issues and Legislation Considered by the Ninety-Sixth Congress. 32 S.c. L. REV. 639, 775-77
(1981). United States Department of Energy statistics show that by 1982, Barnwell housed
14,694,226 cubic feet of low-level waste, approximately 44 percent of all the low-level waste generated in the U.s. between 1962 and 1982. Id. at 774.
50. New York v. United States, 942 F. 2d 114, 116 (2nd Cir. 1991), aifd. 112 S. Ct. 2408
(1992) (citing H.R. REP. No. 314, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3007).
51. MIDWEST INTERSTATE Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACT COMM'N. FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL AND THE
MIDWEST COMPACT COMMISSION, Question 1.6 (1992) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS].
52. Id. Congress specifically intended that the states would not have responsibility for disposing
of waste generated or owned by the U.s. Department of Energy. Such waste, in addition to that
generated by government research on atomic weapons, is disposed of at federal disposal facilities
operated by the Department of Energy. Id. at Question 1.2; see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing waste material that the states may regulate under strict limitations).

386

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:379

ment. 1I3 The National Governors' Association ("NGA") appointed a
task force which recommended that each state be responsible for the
disposal of non-federally produced low-level wastes generated within'
its borders. II' The task force also recommended that the states be
allowed to form interstate compacts for waste disposal and that
these compacts be able to restrict waste disposal only to waste that
was generated within the compact regions. 1I11 Congress incorporated
the task force's suggestions when it enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in 1980,116 adding the requirement that Congress give its consent before a compact could be formed and establishing January 1, 1986, as the date after which compacts could
refuse to accept waste generated outside the region. 1I7
But the LLRWPA lacked effective incentives to induce states to
comply with its provisions. Under the original Act, the Beatty, Richland, and Barnwell sites ll8 were able to refuse access to their dumps
after January 1, 1986 if they became part of a regional compact by
that time. However, even if they became compact members within
that time frame, they were still able to accept out-of-region waste
and levy surcharges on the recalcitrant states that had shipped such
waste. Thus the only motivation for a state to seek out membership
in a compact was the fear of paying a surcharge at some later date.
For most states, however, this fear paled beside the daunting likelihood of becoming their region's host state and having to establish a
low-level waste depository within its borders.
After threats of closure from the operators of the three existing
sites, the NGA negotiated a new "transition package" with the
three depository states ll9 that was enacted into law as the
LLRWPAA of 1985. 60 The Amendments' new deadline is January
1, 1996, a deadline the Amendments' framers believed states would
be more likely to meet since the LLRWPAA sets out periodic mile53. fREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 51, at Question 1.6,
54. New York. 942 f,2d at 117.
55. [d. at 116.
56. H,R. REP. No, 314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 19-20 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.s.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2976 (stating that the NGA proposal served as a foundation for H.R. 1083,
which amended the LLRWPA to provide for a national low-level interstate compact system).
57. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, § 4(a)(2)(B), 94
Stat. 3347, 3348 (repealed 1986).
58. See supra note 46 (listing the six sites the AEC licensed between 1962 and 1971).
59. H.R. REP, No, 314, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3007.
60. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2021 b-2021j (1988).
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stones for developing disposal sites and imposes surcharges on noncomplying states.
II.

WHAT THE STATUTE REQUIRES

A.

Forming Compacts

The Act and its Amendments establish requirements that affect
states forming compacts, as well as those choosing to remain independent. Perhaps most important is the requirement that a compact
be composed of at least two states. 81 Only a compact, not an individual state, may exclude from its dump waste produced outside the
region. 82 This provision was upheld on appeal in Washington State
Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman,8s the only
case specifically construing the LLRWPA of 1980. In Spellman, the
Ninth Circuit found that the state of Washington could not legally
exclude out-of-state waste from its dumpsite because it had not yet
formed an interstate compact. 84 Both the operators of the dumpsite
at Richland, Washington and the United States challenged the constitutionality of the state's initiative prohibiting the "transportation
and storage within Washington of radioactive waste produced
outside the state."811
The Richland site, one of three commercial low-level radioactive
waste dumps still operating in the United States,88 is located on a
section ofthe Hanford Reservation that Washington leases from the
federal government and subleases to the operator. 87 In Spellman,
the plaintiffs argued that the initiative violated the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution and that state authority to regulate nuclear waste disposal was preempted by the AEA and the
LLRWPA.88 The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington agreed 89 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 70 The circuit
61. [d. § 202Ib(4).
62. [d. § 202Ie(a)(3)(B).

63. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1982).
64. [d. at 630.
65.
66.
67.
68.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

69. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.
Wash. 1981), affd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
70. Spellman, 684 F.2d at 632.
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court's decision reflected traditional preemption and Commerce
Clause analysis. In deciding against Washington on the preemption
issue, the court found that the state's purpose in passing the initiative had been to use its police power to protect the health and safety
of its citizens, a job the AEA reserves for the federal government. 71
On the Commerce Clause question, the court found that the initiative failed all three parts of the test usually applied to state statutes
that attempt to regulate the flow of interstate commerce. 72 First, the
initiative banned only out-of-state waste and thus failed to regulate
in an evenhanded manner. 73 Second, the law failed to show how
waste produced in Washington was in any way safer than out-ofstate waste, and thus it did not fulfill a legitimate local purpose. 74
Third, the initiative failed to meet the requirement that it have only
an incidental effect on interstate commerce, as the Richland site was
receiving approximately 40 percent of the country's low-level
waste. 7lI The court found that if Washington had joined a compact,
the compact could have eventually excluded producers of out-of-region wastes from gaining access to the compact's dump.76 A
noncompact state could not do this, however. 77 As the district court
noted, only a "compact may preclude disposal of extra-regional
waste in the compact's regional sites."78
The requirement that a compact be composed of at least two
states has important implications for states choosing not to join a
compact. States that decide to "go it alone" must dispose of the
waste generated within their borders either by opening their own
dump or by arranging to ship waste to a dump located in another
state or compact. 79 However, in order to comply with the statute, a
state choosing to ship waste outside its boundaries must certify that
the "stand-alone" state "will be capable of providing for, and will
provide for, the storage, disposal, or management of any low-level
71. [d. at 631.
72. The three-pronged test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), is the test used
to determine whether state laws that regulate interstate commerce will be upheld. These three
criteria are: (I) evenhanded regulation; (2) fulfillment of a legitimate local public purpose; and
(3) an incidental effect on interstate commerce. [d. at 142.
73. Spellman. 684 F.2d at 631.
74. Jd.
75. [d.
76. [d. at 630.

77. Jd.
78. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. at 932.
79. Jd. at 933.
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radioactive waste generated within such State and requiring disposal
after December 31, 1992 . . . . "80 Presumably, this means a state
can satisfy this requirement by showing that it has contracted with
other states or compacts for the ongoing disposal of its waste. Of
course, the stand-alone state can decide to open its own dump, but if
it does it may not exclude waste from any out-of-state generator.
The authority of a compact to exclude waste generated outside its
region is therefore a state's main incentive for joining a compact.
Thus, opening a dump in a stand-alone state is fraught with risk.
Other states attempting to comply with the statute's directives to
arrange to dispose of their wastes 81 may seek to do so in the dump
of an unaffiliated state, and that unaffiliated state has no authority
to deny access to that out-of-state waste. 82

B.

More Carrots and Sticks

In addition to the requirement that a compact be composed of at
least two states, the second major requirement of the LLRWPAA is
that non-sited states and compacts must have met the statute's milestones and deadlines and achieved operational disposal facilities by
January 1, 1993. 83 To encourage non-sited states to meet the milestones, the Amendments contain both incentives and penalties. The
operation of these incentives, surcharges, and penalty surcharges is
detailed in the statute's two interlocking time frames. 84 These time
frames provide that sited states may levy surcharges on waste generators in addition to the customary disposal fees the generators paid
for waste generated in non-sited states through 1992. 811 One quarter
of this surcharge was kept in an escrow account, to be returned to
the non-sited states upon compliance with the milestones. 88 The
sited states kept the other three quarters of the surcharge. 87 If a
non-sited state did not comply, the potential rebate reverted to the
sited state. 88 An additional penalty surcharge was levied on the
80. 42 U.S.c. § 2021e(e)(I)(C)(ii) (1988).
81. Id. § 2021c.
82. Id. § 2021c(a)(I)(C).
83. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
84. The requirements of both time frames are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(a)-(g) (1988). It is
necessary to read each section in conjunction with the other in order to understand how the two
time frames interlock.
85. Id. § 2021e(d)(I).
86. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(A)-(B).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(F).
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waste disposed of by generators from a non-sited state. 89 Presumably, these generators would pressure their state legislators to follow
the Act's requirements.
The first statutory time frame - the "access" time frame - runs
from January 1, 1986 through January 1, 1996. 90 It initially established a seven-year period - which began on January 1, 1986 and
ended on December 31, 1992 - during which the three states with
operating regional disposal facilities had to make disposal capacity
available for low-level waste generated by non-sited compacts and
non-compact member states. 91 At the end of this seven-year period,
the three states with existing regional waste dumps were no longer
required to accept out-of-region waste. 92
Even before this deadline, however, non-sited compacts and states
that did not belong to a compact could avail themselves of the disposal capacity of the three existing sites during- the seven-year period
by satisfying a set of requirements detailed in a second time frame,
the "milestone" time frame. 93 This second time frame extended
from January 15, 1986 94 to January 1, 1992,9li and therefore ran
almost concurrently with the first seven years of the "access" time
frame. If a state did not comply with these milestones in a timely
manner, it still had access to the three waste dumps through the end
of the seven-year period provided under the "access" time frame,
after which the state became subject to surcharges96 and milestone
incentives. 97 States that did not join a compact or develop independent siting plans by the end of the first seven years of the "access"
time frame continue to be governed by that time frame, which runs
through January 1, 1996. 98 Since 1992, these states - still governed
by the "access" time frame - have faced increasingly severe penalties, including the requirement that they have to take title to the
§ 202Ie(e)(2)(A)-(C).
§§ 202Ie(a)(I), 202Ie(d)(2)(C).
§ 202Ie(a)(I).
§ 202Ie(e)(2)(A).
§ 202Ie(e).
§ 202Ie(d)(2)(B)(i).
95. [d. § 202Ie(e)(2)(D).
96. [d. § 202Ie(d)(I).
97. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2). Milestone incentives include the 25 percent surcharge fee paid by the
waste generator to the sited state that was held in escrow until the waste generator's state complied with the LLRWPAA. Once the state complied with the statute, the money was paid either
to the state or the state's compact commission. See infra notes 100-29 and accompanying text
(discussing the provisions and incentives contained in each time frame).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 202Ie(d)(2)(C) (1988).
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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waste generated within their borders. 99 To show how the time
frames interlock, their provisions are presented below in chronological order.

1.

1986

Under the "milestone" time frame, by July 1, 1986, each state
was required to have either passed legislation showing an intention
to enter into a compact or provided certification of its intent to develop a disposal facility within the state. 100 Under the "access" time
frame, a state disposing of waste not generated in one of the three
sited compact regions could have been charged a surcharge of up to
ten dollars per cubic foot in 1986. 101 Twenty-five percent of this
surcharge was then deposited in an escrow account. 102 If a state met
the first milestone, on July 1, 1986 it received a rebate of 25 percent
of the funds that were held in the escrow account. 103 If a state failed
to meet the first milestone, generators of low-level waste within the
state were charged two times the applicable surcharge for the period
beginning July 1, 1986 and ending December 31, 1986. 104

2.

1987

Under the "access" time frame, a waste generator disposing of its
waste in one of the existing sited compact regions could have been
charged a surcharge not to exceed ten dollars per cubic foot in 1987
for waste not generated in the compact region. 105

3.

1988

Under the "milestone" time frame, each non-sited compact region
was required either to have identified the state where the waste disposal facility would be located or chosen a developer for the facility
and the site to be developed by 1988. 106 Either the compact region
or the state in which the facility was to be located was also required
99. [d.
100. [d. § 202Ie(e)(I)(A). For a discussion of the amount of waste produced in a year, see
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 51, at Question 6.
101. 42 U.S.c. § 202Ie(d)(I)(A) (1988).
102. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(A).
103. [d. § 202 Ie(d)(2)(B)(i). Rebates were to be paid within 30 days of July I, 1986. [d.
§ 202Ie(d)(2)(D).
104. [d. § 202Ie(e)(2)(A)(i).
105. [d. § 2021e(d)(I)(A).
106. [d. § 2021e(e)(I)(B).
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to have developed a siting plan. lo7 .
Under the "access" time frame, if a state did not comply, the
surcharge for 1988 disposal of waste generated outside the region
was not to exceed $20 per cubic foot,l°8 Upon compliance with the
milestone, 25 percent of the surcharge originally paid by the wastegenerating state and deposited in escrow was rebated to that state or
to the compact commission serving that state. I09 If the milestone
was not accomplished by January 1, 1988, the penalty for failure to
comply was that any generator in the region or state was charged
two times the applicable surcharge llO for the period from January 1,
1988 through June 30, 1988, and was charged four times the
surcharge for the period July 1, 1988 through December 31,
1988. 111

4.

1989

Under the "milestone" time frame, a non-sited compact region
that did not meet the milestone of identifying the state where the
facility would be located could, on or after January 1, 1989, be denied its access to the regional disposal facilities. ll2 Under the "access" time frame, the out-of-region disposal surcharge was not to
exceed $20 per cubic foot. 113
5.

1990

Under the "milestone" time frame, all non-sited compact regions
or non-member states were required to have filed an application for
a license to operate a waste dump by 1990. 114 A non-member state,
however, could have provided a written certification to the NRC
that the state would be capable of providing for storage, disposal, or
management of any low-level waste generated within the state and
requiring disposal after December 31, 1992. 111s The penalty for fail107. [d. § 202Ie(e)(I)(B)(i). The siting plan was to provide "detailed procedures and a schedule for establishing a facility location and preparing a facility license application . . . ." [d.
108. [d. § 202Ie(d)(I)(B).
109. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(B)(ii). Rebates were to be paid within 30 days of January 1. 1988. [d.
§ 202Ie(d)(2)(D).
110. [d. § 202 Ie(e)(2)(B)(i)(I).
III. [d. § 202Ie(e)(2)(B)(i)(II).
112. [d. § 202Ie(e)(2)(B)(ii).
113. [d. § 202Ie(d)(I)(B).
114. [d. § 202Ie(e)(I)(C)(i).
115. [d. § 202Ie(e)(I)(C)(ii).
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ure to comply was that the waste generated within the state or nonsited compact region might not have been accepted by existing disposal facilities. 116 Under the "access" time frame, if a state did not
comply, the surcharge for 1990 disposal of out-of-region waste was
not to exceed $40 per cubic foot. 117 Once again, if a state did comply with the milestone, 25 percent of the surcharge originally paid
by the waste-generating state and deposited in escrow for the period
January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1989, was rebated to that
state or to the compact commission serving that state. 118

6.

1991

Under the "access" time frame, the surcharge for out-of-region
disposal was not to exceed $40 per cubic foot. 119

7.

1992

Under the "milestone" time frame, a complete application for a
license to operate a waste disposal facility within each non-sited
compact region or non-member state should have been filed. 120 Also,
if a non-sited compact region or non-member state failed to comply
with the milestone, any waste generator within the region or state
was charged three times the applicable surcharge for the period beginning June 1, 1992 and ending on the filing of the application. l21
Under the "access" time frame, the surcharge for waste disposal
was not to exceed $40 per cubic foot. 122 Further, under this time
frame the 25 percent held in escrow between January 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1992 was to be paid to the waste-generating state, or
the compact commission serving such state, if the compact region or
state of the waste's origin could provide for disposal of all the waste
generated within the region or state by January 1, 1993. 123
116. [d. § 202Ie(e)(2)(C).
117. [d. § 202Ie(d)(I)(C).
118. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(B)(iii). Rebates were to be paid within 30 days of January I, 1990. [d.
§ 202Ie(d)(2)(D).
119. [d. § 202Ie(d)(I)(C).
120. [d. § 202Ie(e)(I)(D).
12I. [d. § 202Ie(e)(2)(D).
122. [d. § 202Ie(d)( I)(C). Therefore. since the "milestone" time frame provided for a penalty
in the amount of three times the maximum applicable surcharge under the "access" time frame
($40). the maximum penalty for this time period was $160 per foot (3 x $40 + $40).
123. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(B)(iv).

394

8.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:379

1993

Under the "access" time frame, if a compact region or non-member state failed to provide for disposal of all its low-level waste by
January 1, 1993, it faced two alternatives. 124 One alternative was
that at the request of the generator or owner, each state in which
low-level waste was generated would be required to take title to and
possession of the waste. 1211 If the state failed to take possession as
soon after January 1, 1993 as the generator or owner notified the
state that the waste could be shipped, then the state was liable for
damages incurred by the generator or owner flowing from the state's
failure. 128 The second alternative was that if a state or region
elected not to take title and possession, 25 percent of any amount
collected during the period January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1992
would be repaid, with interest, to each generator from whom the
surcharge was collected. 127

9.

1996

Finally, if a state or region in which low-level waste is generated
is unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste by January 1,
1996, that state shall, at the request of the generator or owner of
the waste, not only take title to the waste, but also be obligated to
take possession of the waste. 128 Again, the state shall be liable for
all damages to the generator or owner caused by the state's failure
to take possession. 129

III.

THE STATES' PROGRESS IN FORMING AND SITING COMPACTS

The LLRWPAA dictates that "[e]ach State shall be responsible
for providing, either by itself or in cooperation with other States, for
the disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste generated within the
State . . . . "130 To carry out this goal, federal policy espouses regional disposal, with states entering into "such compacts as may be
124. [d. § 202 Ie(d)(2)(C).
125. [d.
126. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(C)(i).
127. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(C)(ii). As a result, the 25 percent rebate was an incentive for states to
take possession of the waste.
128. [d. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
129. [d. § 202Ie(d)(2)(C)(ii). The state is only liable from the first point in 1996 at which the
owner or generator notifies the state that the waste is available for shipment. [d.
130. [d. § 202Ic(a)(I).
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necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of regional
disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste. "131

A.
1.

Formation of Compacts

Options

In enacting the amendments, Congress assumed that the states
would align themselves regionally into six or eight compacts. 132 As
previously mentioned, Congress requires that a compact region be
comprised of at least two states;133 thus, the ability of a compact to
exclude out-of-region waste is one of the incentives for each state to
join a compact. 134 Each state has two options: (1) join a compact
and participate in the decision as to which state will become the
region's host site, with the concomitant ability to exclude waste generated outside the compact region; or (2) remain independent, in
which case it must either (a) make disposal capacity available to its
generators within the state at a site which it will not be able to close
to out-of-state generators or (b) mah: arrangements to ship its
waste to another state or compact (and pay a surcharge for the
privilege) .

2.

Incentives

The surcharges, penalties, and take-title provisions seem to be effective incentives. The great weakness of the original Act was the
absence of sufficiently powerful incentives to ensure compliance with
the statute's goals. By 1985, Congress had approved seven compacts. 13G By 1992, after passage of the Amendments, Congress had
ratified a total of nine compacts. 136 While only two other compacts
have been approved since the LLRWPAA was passed, this number
does not reflect the furious activity that has taken place within the
existing compacts and among the unaligned states: Since the
Amendments were passed, seven states have moved from one com131. [d. § 202Id(a)(2).
132. 126 CONGo REC. 20,136 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
133. 42 U.S.c. § 202Ib(4) (1988).
134. 126 CONGo REc. 20,136 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
135. Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99240, §§ 201-27,99 Stat. 1859 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021d notes (1988 &
Supp II 1991 ». See also infra note 143 and accompanying text (listing the seven compacts that
were originally proposed).
136. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2416 (1992).
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pact to another I37 and four unaligned states have joined new
compacts. 138
The Amendments also resolved questions regarding who has ultimate authority over a compact. 139 Not only must Congress ratify
each compact,140 but the Amendments also require Congressional
review of compacts every five years. 14I The regulations also stipulate
that Congress may dissolve a compact at any time if it breaks a
state or federal law. 142

B.

Compacts Negotiated Before 1985

Seven compacts 143 were negotiated by 1985, and they were subse137. These states were Wyoming, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Arizona, and
Utah.
138. South Dakota and California joined the Southwestern Compact, while Pennsylvania and
West Virginia formed the Appalachian Compact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021d notes (1988). However,
one aligned state embarked on a course of conduct that would lead to its ouster from a compact;
Michigan was kicked out of the Midwest Compact on July 14, 1991. See infra notes 155-80 and
accompanying text (describing the circumstances that led to Michigan's ouster).
139. Mostaghel, supra note 14, at 87 ("Congress has given up its right to be the exclusive
regulator in this case.").
140. 42 U.S.c. § 202Id(c)(2) (1988). The statute provides that "[a)ny authority in a compact
to restrict the use of the regional disposal facilities under the compact to the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste generated within the compact region shall not take affect before . . . Congress
by law consents to the compact." [d. § 202Id(c).
141. [d. § 202Id(d). Such review was not required under the Original Act.
142. [d. § 202Id(b)(4)-(5).
143. These seven original compacts were:
I) The Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Potential members were Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming;
2) The Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Potential members
were Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Oklahoma;
3) The Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact:
Potential members were Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia;
4) The Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Potential
members were Illinois and Kentucky;
5) The Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact: Potential members were Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and
Wisconsin;
6) The Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Potential members
were Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and
7) The Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact:
Potential members were Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland.
Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240,
§§ 201-27,99 Stat. 1859 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021d notes (1988 &
Supp. " 1991».
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quently approved under Title II of the LLRWPAA, the Omnibus
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act
("Omnibus Compact Consent Act").144 Passage of the Omnibus
Compact Consent Act meant that the potential members of the
seven ratified compacts had official compacts to join after completing the proper steps necessary to obtain state approval of membership. States and regions not designated as potential members of any
compact at that time were California, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.14~

C.

Current Compacts, Host States, and Unaffiliated States

After much jockeying back and forth, the current compact configuration includes nine compacts, all of which have at least one host
state. These present-day compacts closely resemble the compacts negotiated in 1985, but with some variations in membership.146
144. ld.
145. In 1988, the states negotiated and Congress approved two additional compacts. These
were the Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, open initially to Arizona and California, and the Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, open initially to
Pennsylvania and West Virginia. See Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 100-712, §§ 1-5,102 Stat. 4773 (1988) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 2021d notes (1988»; Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 100-319, 102 Stat. 471 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. 2021d
notes (1988».
146. The current compact formations are as follows:
I) The Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Current members include Alaska, Idaho, Hawaii, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington. Wyoming, originally a member, is now affiliated only with the Rocky
Mountain Compact. The host state, as could be predicted, is Washington.
2) The Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Current members
include Arkansas, Louisiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. No longer included
are Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and North Dakota. The host state is Nebraska.
3) The Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact:
Current members include Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The host state is currently South Carolina. The original configuration of this compact remains unchanged.
4) The Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Current
members include Kentucky and the host state Illinois.
5) The Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact:
Current members are Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
Michigan is no longer a member of this compact, and Ohio is the host state.
6) The Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Current members
are Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Wyoming, with Nevada serving as the host
state. Initial potential members Arizona and Utah are no longer in this compact.
7) The Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact:
The current and original members of this compact include Connecticut, Delaware,
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Ten states or regions remain unaffiliated as of this writing. I•7
They are the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Vermont,US Of these ten, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico - each of which produces
less than one percent of the nation's low-level waste - have no
plans to develop waste disposal repositories,l.9 The other states, with
the possible exception of Michigan, are proceeding to select sites to
comply with the milestones discussed above,uo
IV.

CHALLENGES TO THE LLRWPAA

Even with the Amendments' incentives, some states are still reluctant to commit themselves to the concept of shared waste disposal.
Michigan and New York took two different paths to avoid the statute's ultimate strictures. Michigan joined a compact but then used
every possible delay tactic, which included challenging the statute
on constitutional grounds,m Unlike Michigan, New York did not
join a compact,ICi2 And while New York did comply with the
LLRWPAA, it also challenged the statute in court,us New York's
course of action resulted in the Supreme Court's invalidation of one
Maryland, and New Jersey. Both Connecticut and New Jersey have been designated
host states.
8) The Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Current members include California, Arizona, North Dakota, and South Dakota, with California serving
as the host state. The Dakotas are both additions to the compact's original
configuration.
9) The Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact: Current members are West Virginia and host state Pennsylvania.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE. Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACTS AND UNAFFILIATED STATES, GAO illustration, GAO/RCED092-61 (\991) [hereinafter GAO Illustration]
(available from the Midwest Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission).
147. [d.

148. Connecticut offered to buy space in a disposal facility to be built by Texas, but Texas
refused because of Connecticut's high volume of waste. Texas instead will accept shipments from
Vermont and Maine. Robert Tomsho, Environment. WALL ST. 1.. June 22, 1993, at BI.
149. GAO 1Ilustration, supra note 146.
ISO. [d.

151. Michigan challenged the LLRWPAA on the ground that it violated state sovereignty
guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. Michigan v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 997 (W.O. Mich.
1991). The court granted the government's motion to dismiss the case on the basis that the
LLRWPAA was a legitimate exercise of federal Commerce Clause regulatory authority. [d. at
1004-05. The court stated that the proper means of challenging the Act was to petition the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. [d.
152. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2416 (\992).
153. [d. at 2416-17.
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of the Amendments' key provisions. 1II4 Although Michigan's conduct
was more local in effect than that of New York, an examination of
Michigan's behavior is useful because it exposes the weaknesses inherent in the LLRWPAA that did not come up during New York's
challenge to the statute.

A.
1.

Michigan and the Midwest Compact: Going No Place Fast
Formation of the Compact

The seven original members of the Midwest Compact - Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin passed compact-enabling legislation in the early 1980s, UII and Congress ratified the compact in 1985. U8 As is typical under such legislation, the compact is administered by a Compact Commission created by the member states. U7 Each state appoints a Compact
Commissioner according to individual state law and the Commission
holds annual meetings that are open to the public. u8 The compact
cannot vote to add member states, nor can it accept out-of-region
waste, unless the host states agree by affirmative vote. U9 Member
states may withdraw from the compact only if they repeal the enabling legislation. l80 However, they may be ousted if the other member states find that they have failed to discharge their responsibilities either as a member state or as a host state. l8l The Compact
Commission selects a host state using criteria developed by its members, or a member state can volunteer to serve as the host state. l82 A
member state's .responsibilities include paying fees as well as reviewing and commenting on the host state's site selection and disposal
154. [d. at 2427-28.
155. See 1983 Ind. Acts 1141 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-9-1 to -14 (Burns 1990 &
Supp. 1993»; 1983 Iowa Acts 9 (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 457B (West Supp. 1993»; 1982
Mich. Pub. Acts 460 (codified at MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 3.751 (West Supp. 1993»; 1983
Minn. Laws 2409 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116C.831-.843 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993»;
1984 Mo. Laws 42 (codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 260.700-.735 (Vernon Supp. 1993)); 1984
Ohio Laws 3494 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3747.01-.05 (Anderson 1992»; 1983 Wis.
Laws 1686 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.10-.12 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993».
156. Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99240, § 225, 99 Stat. 1859, 1892-1902 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.s.C. 2021d notes
(1988 & Supp. II 1991».
157. E.g.. IOWA CODE ANN. § 457B.1 art. III (West Supp. 1993).
158. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 51, at Question 2.2.
159. [d. at Question 2.3.
160. E.g.. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116C.831 art. VIII(e) (West 1987).
161. E.g.. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 3.751 art. VIII(f) (West Supp. 1993).
162. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 51, at Questions 3.1-3.2.
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technology. The host state's primary responsibilities are to select a
site, choose a disposal technology, and then make the site operational, all within the time frames set by the statute. 163

2.

Michigan Draws the Short Straw

The Midwest Compact Commission formally designated four
member states - Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin - as
host states on February 27, 1987. 164 After the governors of these
four states were notified of the designations, the designees entered a
90-day period within which they could have withdrawn from the
compact without suffering any financial penalty.1611 None of the designated hosts exercised this option and, on June 30, 1987, the Compact Commission chose Michigan to site and build the compact's
first regional dump.166 The Commission considered various factors
in selecting Michigan, including the volume of waste generated and
the feasibility of transporting the waste. 16? Based on these same criteria, the Commission selected Ohio as the first alternate host state
and Minnesota as the second alternate host state. 168

3.

Not a Gracious Host

Michigan's lack of enthusiasm for developing a regional low-level
nuclear waste disposal site became evident soon after its selection.
In the fall of 1987, the same year Michigan was designated the first
actual host, the Michigan legislature approved resolutions inviting
Congress to review the disposal policies expressed in the Amendments and to declare a moratorium on siting facilities until the review was completed. 169 Throughout the next three years, Michigan
took part in negotiations to set up agreements that would have provided the state with funds from the Commission to develop the site,
with payback guaranteed by the Michigan utilities operating nu163. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (listing the legislation of each state authorizing the Midwest Compact).
164. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 51, at Question 3.1.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Jd.
.
Jd.
Jd. at Question 3.2.
Jd. at Question 3.1.
169. MIDWEST INTERSTATE Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACT COMMISSION, Ac·
TIONS By MICHIGAN SHOWING THAT IT HAS FAILED To DISCHARGE ITs OBLIGATION As HOST
STATE FOR THE MIDWEST COMPACT'S FIRST REGIONAL DISPOSAL FACILITY 1 (1991) [hereinafter
ACTIONS By MICHIGAN).
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clear power plants.l7° The state's participation was so half-hearted
that after negotiations concerning three separate agreements remained inconclusive, the utilities indicated to the Commission that
"there was no reason for the utilities to proceed with negotiation of
a Guaranty because they had no confidence in Michigan's siting
program . . . . "171 In 1987, the Michigan legislature passed "the
most protective low-level radioactive waste containment facility site
selection criteria in the nation."172 Then, in 1989, Michigan's governor, James Blanchard, threatened to introduce legislation withdrawing the state from the compact if member states did not join with
Michigan in correcting flaws in the compact and seeking changes in
federal laws. 17s Despite these actions, however, the Compact Commission in 1989 circulated a draft of a joint Governors' Certificate
in order to comply with the 1990 federal milestone. 174 While the
member states had four opportunities to review and revise drafts of
the Certificate, all the compact's governors signed except Governor
Blanchard. 1711
Gubernatorial politics apparently made Michigan's status as a
host state a "hot" issue. Governor Blanchard, seeking reelection in
1990, stated that" [0] ur goal is to keep a low-level radioactive waste
dump out of Michigan."176 His opponent, John Engler, stated in an
election debate that he "would continue as Governor to fight the
location of this dump in Michigan because ultimately in the nation
there will only be three or four dumps and its [sic] in our interest to
make sure one of them isn't in Michigan."177
Michigan's restrictive siting criteria ultimately led to the elimination of most of the candidate sites in Michigan. 178 Eventually, the
Michigan Senate passed a resolution requesting that the Midwest
Compact relieve it of host status since it could not find a site. 179 Fed
170. [d. at 2-7.
171. [d. at 7.

172. [d. at 13 (citing 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts 204, §§ 333.26210-.26211 (codified at MICH.
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 325.491 (West 1992))).
173. [d. at 1-2.
174. [d. at 7-8. The Governors' certification was required to comply with the 1990 federal
milestone for development of new disposal facilities. 42 U.S.C. 202Ie(e)(I)(C)(ii) (1988).
175. ACTIONS By MICHIGAN, supra note 169, at 7-8. Governor Blanchard did submit certification under separate cover, but it did not contain a projected operation date that was included in
the document the other governors signed. [d.
176. [d. at 8 (quoting Governor Blanchard's press release of February 9, 1990).
177. [d. (quoting the gubernatorial election debate of October 6, 1990).
178. [d. at 13-18.
179. [d. at 12. The Senate passed the resolution on May 17, 1990, but no action was taken by
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up with Michigan's stalling tactics, the Midwest Compact revoked
Michigan's membership on July 24, 1991. 180

4. What Can Be Learned From Michigan and the Midwest
Compact?
Compacts may want to consider several factors that emerged as
important during the four years Michigan remained a member of
the Midwest Compact. First, Article VIII of the Midwest Compact
provides for a 90-day period during which designated host states can
withdraw from the compact. l8l Ninety days, however, may be too
short a time for a state to realistically ascertain whether or not it
has suitable site areas available. On the other hand, Michigan's
membership in the compact was not revoked until July 24, 1991,
more than four years after it was designated the host state. 182 Considering the relatively short overall time frame of the Amendments
(under which states and compacts are to have disposal facilities in
operation by 1996), allowing a potential host state four years to decide it does not want to remain in the compact is an indulgence the
remaining member states can hardly afford.
Compacts might also want to consider the factors the Midwest
Compact used in choosing the host states. The ranking of the states
for purposes of determining host status was based mainly on waste
generation, although transportation received some consideration as
welJ.183 It might be useful for future compacts to give greater consideration to a state's geographical makeup because some areas are
physically unsuitable for waste disposal and knowing how great a
percentage of a state's terrain might be unsuitable could affect a
state's ranking.
Finally, in the future, member states should be required to reveal
their siting criteria at the outset. A compact might also want to establish an upper limit on the restrictiveness of these criteria prior to
the selection of a host state.
the Michigan House of Representatives. [d.
180. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 51, at Question 2.1.
181. Omnibus Low-level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99240, § 225,99 Stat. 1859, 1901 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. 2021d notes (1988 &
Supp. II 1991».
.
182. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 51, at Question 2.1.
183. [d. at Question 3.2.
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New York's Constitutional Challenge: Striking at the Heart
of the Amendments

Michigan was not alone in choosing to forego a nuclear waste
compact. After breaking off compact negotiations with several
northeastern states, New York decided not to join a compact but
rather to develop its own waste disposal sites. 18' Pursuant to the incentives built into the 1985 Amendments, New York selected two
counties as possible low-level waste dump sites. 1811 However, in 1990
New York and the two counties filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York against the
United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
LLRWPAA's three incentives 186 violated the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as the Guaranty and Due Process Clauses. 187 The District Court dismissed the
complaint,188 and the Second Circuit affirmed that decision. 189 On'
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the monetary and access
incentives were constitutional but that the take-title provision
"crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion";19o it
either lay "outside Congress' enumerated powers"19l or infringed
"upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment . . . ."192
In laying the groundwork for the majority's analysis of the stat184. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2416 (1992).
185. Id. at 2416-17.
186. New York challenged the monetary, access, and take-title incentives. Id. at 2408; see a/so
supra note 100-29 (discussing the incentives provided by the Amendments).
187. New York v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), affd. 942 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1991), affd & rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
188. New York. 757 F. Supp. at 13.
189. New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir. 1991), affd & rev·d. 112 S. Ct. 2408
(1992).
190. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2428. The plaintiffs did not appeal their Due Process and Eleventh Amendment claims. Id. at 2408.
191. Id. at 2429.
192. Id. The take-title provision, the strongest incentive in the Amendments, provides that a
state or compact region unable to provide for the disposal of the low-level radioactive waste created in its state or region by the January I, 1993 deadline would:
(Ujpon the request of the generator or owner of the waste
take title to the waste,
. . . be obligated to take possession of the waste, and
be liable for all damages
directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence of the
failure of the State to take possession of the waste as soon after January I, 1993 as
the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment
42 U.s.c. § 202Ie(d)(2)(C)(i) (1988).
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ute, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor examined the difference between
federal and state power. She claimed that since the states retain
significant sovereign authority under the Tenth Amendment/ 93
when a Congressional action limits a particular aspect of state
power the state power must be examined to see if it is protected by
any Constitutional limits on Congressional power. 194 The Court
noted that the LLRWPAA authorizes states with disposal sites to
impose surcharges on wastes shipped to the sites from other
states. 19li If a state were to impose such surcharges unilaterally, its
action might be considered a burden on interstate commerce under
the Constitution's Commerce Clause. 196 However, the Court found
the LLRWPAA's surcharge provisions to be a legitimate exercise of
Congress's ability to authorize states to place burdens on interstate
commerce pursuant to the powers enumerated in the Commerce
Clause. 197 Similarly, collecting a percentage of the surcharge l98 is a
legitimate exercise of Congress's taxing power. 199 And the third part
of the first set of incentives - the requirement that the states meet
the statute's milestones before they can get back some of the escrowed funds 200 - is also well within Congress's authority under
the Spending Clause. 201 Since Congress possesses the authority to
enforce the first set of incentives - the "monetary incentives" - its
exercise of power is constitutionally legitimate; the resulting statutory incentives are not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and
thus do not violate state sovereignty.202
The Court also held that the second set of incentives - which
provide that sited compacts may gradually increase access costs to
their sites and may ultimately deny access to waste generated
outside the region 203 - fall within the preemption aspect of Congress's commerce power. Where Congress has enacted a regulatory
I

193. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people," U.S, CONST. amend. X.
194. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 549 (1985)).
195. [d. at 2425.
196. [d. at 2425-26.
197. [d. at 2425.
198. [d. at 2426.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

[d.
[d.

[d.
[d. at 2427.
[d.
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scheme governing private activity that conflicts with a state regulation, that state regulation will fai1. 204 However, only conflicting regulations will be preempted; earlier cases examining federal regulation of private activity "recognized the ability of Congress to offer
states the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation."205
The Court noted that a state mayor may not choose to regulate
nuclear waste disposal, but if it does choose to do so, it must follow
federal standards. 208 Following federal standards in this case means
establishing self-sufficiency either by developing a local dump or by
joining a regional compact. But if a state chooses not to regulate
nuclear waste at all it will not be able to develop a waste dump, and
waste-producing residents would therefore have to search outside
the state for a disposal facility. That search would subject the individual waste producers, but not the state, to the federal scheme
under which sited states and compacts operate. Therefore, since the
second set of incentives, the "access incentives," offer a true choice
to states - that is, whether or not to regulate - the Court concluded that these incentives do not interfere with state sovereignty
and are not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. 207
Justice O'Connor considered the third set of incentives to be fundamentally different from the first two. According to her analysis,
the take-title provisions do not present the states with a true choice
of whether or not to regulate. Rather, the states are presented with
the choice of whether or not to accept ownership of and responsibility for the waste or to regulate according to the mandates of
Congress. 208
The Court did not consider this a choice at all because Congress
does not possess the power to impose either of the two separate alternatives. 209 The Court noted that Congress cannot simply transfer
the ownership of waste from in-state generators to the state in which
it was generated, or transfer liability for generators' damages to the
204. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) ("The government of the
United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitutions or laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.''') (citation omitted).
205. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2427 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1981);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1980».
206. {d. at 2427.
207. {d.
208. {d. at 2428.
209. {d.
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state, because these transfers would amount to a federally-imposed
subsidy of waste generators by the state. 210 In other words, the
Court concluded that Congress does not possess the power to impose
on the states the first alternative under the take-title provisions. According to the Court, such "federal action would 'commandeer' state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and
would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division
of authority between federal and state governments."211
The Court found the second alternative, that the states must follow the dictates of the LLRWPAA in order to avoid being forced to
take title to the waste, to be "a simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress,"212 a command
without constitutional authority. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can permit the states to discriminate against interstate commerce, as it did in the first two sets of incentives: one set allows sited
states to impose surcharges on waste received from other states,213
while the other allows states and compacts with waste dumps to increase the cost for out-of-state or out-of-region disposal and then to
deny such disposal altogether. 214 Under the spending clause, the
Court stated that Congress can put conditions on federal funding to
the states, as it did in the first set of incentives by requiring the
states to comply with the milestones before they can receive
surcharge repayments. 2H1 However, the Court, finding no grant of
authority that justified the take-title provision, held that the provision infringed the sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.216
The Court also set up a distinction between federal laws that affect both state and private activity and federal laws that affect only
state activity.217 According to the Court, laws affecting both state
and private activity provide a viable choice: states may regulate according to federal standards or may enact state regulations not preempted by federal law. 218 Allowing the states to regulate subject to
210. [d.
211. [d.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

[d.
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at

2425-26.
2427.
2426-27.
2429.
See id. at 2423-25.
[d. at 2420, 2424.
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federal limitations has been called "cooperative federalism. "219
Laws regulating only state activity fail to provide any choice at all
because not only must the states regulate, but they must regulate
according to federal standards. A law which fails to give a state a
choice of whether or not to regulate is perceived as inherently coercive,220 and it is this coercion that takes such laws out of the realm
of cooperative federalism.
Justice O'Connor's analysis of federal-state interactions in New
York reflects her approval of schemes that, like the Clean Air
Act,221 are structured as a "partnership between the States and the
Federal Government, animated by a shared objective .. ~ ."222 For
Justice O'Connor, the key issue that determines if a federal law requiring state action is so coercive that it is unconstitutional is
whether, under the law, the state retains accountability.223 According to the majority in New York, "Where Congress encourages state
regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain
accountable. to the people."224 Under Justice O'Connor's view, if the
citizens of New York elect state officials to carry out their desire
that New York not implement any provisions for nuclear waste dis219. Id. at 2424 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 289
(1980». The New York court cited the following acts as examples of cooperative federalism: the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (1988); the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(1988); and the Resource·Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.c. § 6901 (1988). New
York, 112 S.Ct. at 2424; see also Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal
Courts and State Power. 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1987) (discussing the notion of state autonomy
and the effect federal law has on that autonomy); Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of
State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism. 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 874
(1985) (arguing that the theories underlying the notion of federalism dictate a much broader role
for the Supreme Court in reviewing state court decisions); John M. Wisdom, Foreword: The EverWhirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063 (1984) (tracing the
development of federalism and discussing how the modern-day conception of federalism differs
from what the Framers intended).
220. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424. See generally Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 60-70
( 1988) (discussing the modest restraint that the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution places
on federal attempts to commandeer state executive and legislative power). But see D. Bruce La
Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process - The Alternative to Judicial
Review of Federalism Issues. 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577,656-65 (1985) (arguing that Congress's use
of the states as agents to implement national regulatory programs is justified to the extent that
national political accountability exists).
221. Clean Air Act, 42 U.s.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
222. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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posal, Congress could legitimately pass federal legislation to fill that
gap. What the federal government cannot do, however, is pass legislation forcing New York to regulate a specific area, because New
York's elected officials would no longer retain accountability for the
laws they are required to enforce. According to Justice O'Connor,
since one of the primary attributes of a sovereign is accountability
for its actions, a federal law that forces a state to control its citizens'
behavior but does not allow the state to be accountable to those citizens intrudes too far upon the sovereignty of the state. Such a law,
therefore, cannot withstand a constitutional challenge under the
Tenth Amendment. 221i
The majority in New York used the Tenth Amendment to justify
its finding that the take-title provisions are an unconstitutional intrusion upon state sovereignty,226 but the opinion overlooked critical
Tenth Amendment case law. The Court upheld the first two incentives because it could find some grant of authority to cover them,
but the Court failed to find an appropriate home for the third incentive and subsequently held that it intruded upon an area of state
authority. In deciding New York, however, Justice O'Connor declined to revisit the holdings of previous Tenth Amendment cases
because, according to her analysis, the take-title provision applied
only to state activity; it was "not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties."227 Since the take-title provision only regulated state and not
225. See id.
226. ld. at 2428.
227. ld. at 2420. Justice O'Connor did acknowledge the unsteady path the Court's jurisprudence has taken in this area but noted that it was not the time to revisit the holdings of those
cases. See, e.g.. Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (holding that Missouri's mandatory
retirement age for state judges did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act since a
state's authority to determine the qualifications of judges "lies at the heart of representative government"); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (finding that § 310(b)(l) of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which removed the federal income tax exemption
for interest earned on long-term state and federal government bearer bonds, did not violate the
Tenth Amendment); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities and holding state employers are once again subject to the Fair
Labor Standards Act); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (ruling that the Tenth Amendment does not preclude extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to cover state and
local government employees as the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause); Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (holding that
Congress's authority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry does not impair a state's
ability to carry out its sovereign functions and is therefore not violative of the Tenth Amendment);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Wirtz and holding state
employers are not subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975) (upholding the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970); Maryland v.
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private activity, it was not a "generally applicable law" such as
those with which recent Supreme Court Tenth Amendment cases
have been concerned. 228 Therefore Justice O'Connor saw no need to
analyze the LLWRPAA under Tenth Amendment precedent.
Rather, using traditional Commerce Clause analysis, she characterized the statute as one that compels the states to fulfill federal mandates without giving them a choice of whether to regulate at all. 229
But merely because a provision is not made under an affirmative
grant does not necessarily mean it infringes on the Tenth Amendment. According to Justice Byron White's partial dissent in New
York,230 the distinction between laws that regulate state and private
activity and laws that regulate only state activity is an artificial distinction that allowed the Court to invalidate the take-title provision
without analyzing the provision under Tenth Amendment case
law. 231 As Justice White pointed out, "The Court's distinction between a federal statute's regulation of States and private parties for
general purposes, as opposed to a regulation solely on the activities
of States, is unsupported by our recent Tenth Amendment cases. In
no case has the Court rested its holding on such a distinction."232
The question, according to Justice White, was not whether Congress had the power to regulate state or private disposal of nuclear
waste but whether Congress could legitimately sanction the interstate compromises the states had reached. 233 Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate the interstate nuclear
waste disposal market. 234 Congress may also give the states the
choice to regulate this activity according to federal standards or, if a
state chooses not to regulate the area, to have the federal governWirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding that state schools and hospitals are subject to the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
228. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420.
229. [d. at 2428-29.
230. [d. at 2435 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor expressed the unanimous view of the Court that the monetary and access provisions were constitutional. Joining her in holding the take-title provision unconstitutional were Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas.
Justice White dissented with respect to the take-title provision, and was joined by Justices Harry
Blackmun and John Paul Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissent regarding the
take-title provision.
231. [d. at 2441 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232. [d. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that neither National
League nor Garcia was decided based on this distinction).
233. [d. at 2435 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. [d. at 2419-20.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

410

[Vol. 43:379

ment regulate it instead. 2311 While this kind of legitimate choice does
not violate the Tenth Amendment, validating a statu~e based solely
on the existence of this kind of "either/or" choice provision overlooks other ways of viewing federal-state interactions. Justice White
characterized the LLRWPAA as an example of cooperative federalism because he thought it could best be understood as "collective
state action,"236 as a "complex interstate agreement,"237 and as "a
delicate compromise"238 among the states.
One commentator has called "cooperative federalism" a euphel)1ism for "the substantial expansion of federal power at the expense
of state authority,"239 positing an alternative characterization of the
federal system as one of "interactive federalism. "240 Although Justice White did not use this specific term, it seems to embody his
concept of federalism. Under such a view, the LLRWPAA is the
mechanism through which collectively-negotiated compromises can
be effectuated. Given that the states did not want Congress to set up
a federal regulatory plan, the take-title provision is not an unconstitutional infringement on state autonomy but rather the states' selected means of enforcement. 241 The traditional Commerce Clause
choice would have forced the states to regulate disposal of nuclear
waste either according to the federal plan or to accept the fact that
they could not regulate at all and have the federal plan fill the vacuum caused by the lack of state regulation. The states felt that this
choice, though constitutionally permissible under the Commerce
Clause, was too coercive. 242 Specifically, they did not want Congress
to decide where the waste repositories would be. 243 Instead, what
they did want was to develop a solution at the state level. 244 While
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 2420.
at 2439 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
at 2441 (White, J .• concurring in part and dissenting in part).
at 2446 (White, J .• concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Redish, supra note 219, at 874.
240. ld. at 880-81.

241. See, e.g.. Status of Interstate Compacts for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive
Waste: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (I983) (statement of Idaho Gov. John Evans, chairman of the Nuclear Power Subcommittee of the National
Governors Association). Evans emphasized that each of the regions and their compacts had held
strenuous negotiations in order to resolve problems unique to each region. ld. at 5. As a result,
Evans urged Congress not to require rigid agreement in the compacts. ld.
242. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
243. ld. at 2437 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that this would
force the states to "submit to another federal instruction").
244. ld. at 2436-37 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing H.R. REP. No.
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the states realized that Congress's authority was needed to implement the plan, Congress's role was seen as that of a referee who
keeps all the players in the game, not as a super player who could
come onto the field to replace a state player. 2411 The states' solution
looked like the first half of the .traditional Commerce Clause choice:
the states could regulate according to federal standards, although
these were actually the same standards the states themselves had
asked Congress to incorporate into the statute. The states rejected
the second half of the Commerce Clause choice: they did not want
the government to have the option of stepping in to fill the void in
the instance a state chose not to regulate according to federal standards. 246• Therefore, rather than rejecting the take-title provision because it did not fit the mold of a legitimate choice under the Commerce Clause, the Court could have formulated a different question:
Whether cooperative federalism allows the states to give up the second half of a Commerce Clause choice provision? A review of Tenth
Amendment case law suggests that the answer to this question is
"yes."
The very Tenth Amendment cases that Justice O'Connor failed to
revisit in striking down the take-title provision 247 appear to support
the states' ability to negotiate with each other and with Congress to
solve the waste disposal problem. These Tenth Amendment cases
focus on "ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and
state power."248 In Fry v. United States,249 which concerned a state
challenge to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,2110 the Supreme Court stated that "[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations."2111 To control high
314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt 2, at 18 (1985); 126 CONGo REC. 20,135-136 (daily ed. July 29,
1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond». See also FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 51,
at Question 1.5.
245. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
246. [d. at 2436-37 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. See supra note 227 (noting cases that illustrate the unsteady path of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence).
248. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
249. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
250. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 201, 84 Stat. 799 (1970)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("The Act . . . provided for
its expiration on April 30, 1974.")
251. Fry. 421 U.S. at 547.
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rates of inflation, the Act had authorized the President to stabilize
wages and salaries,2112 with the annual salary increases of covered
employees not to exceed 5.5 percent. 2113 Ohio applied for approval
under the statute of a 10.6 percent increase,2114 but the Pay Board,
established under the statute to oversee wage and salary controls,
denied approval of such an increase. 21111 Two state employees sought
to compel the state to honor the increase, and the Ohio Supreme
Court granted their writ of mandamus and ordered payment. 2116 The
United States then filed suit to enjoin Ohio from making the payments. 2117 On certification from the district court, the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals held that the Act applied to state employees, concluding that this type of federal interference with state
affairs was justifiable since large wage increases to large numbers of
employees would substantially affect commerce. 2118 The Supreme
Court later affirmed this decision. 2119
Similarly, the Amendments' take-title provision, which required
states to provide for disposal or take title to the waste, can arguably
be viewed as regulating purely intrastate activity. But eliminating
this take-title provision from the statute hampers the LLRWPAA's
ability to force states to comply with its timetable. If a state does
not move quickly to fulfill the statute's dictates, time for accessing
the existing waste sites will run out. States will then put pressure
yet again on Congress to force the sited states to keep their dumps
open. Such pressure by any particular state, combined with similar
activity on the part of the other non-sited states, may be seen as
activity affecting interstate commerce. Thus, the New York Court
could have found that the Commerce Clause validated the take-title
provIsion.
The state employees who brought the action in Fry contended
that applying the Economic Stability Act to state employees was an
interference with state sovereignty.26o The Fry Court replied that
while the Tenth Amendment "is not without significance,"261 it only
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.c. § 1904 (1988 & supp. IV 1992).
Fry. 421 U.S. at 544.
.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 545.
[d. at 547.
[d. at 548.
[d. at 547 n.7.

[d.
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protects the states against a Congressional exercise of power "that
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system."262 The Fry Court determined that the Economic
Stability Act's "wage restriction regulations constituted no such
drastic invasion of state sovereignty."263 Although the Fry Court did
not deal specifically with the question of accountability, elected
Ohio officials complying with the Act had no control over wage increases for state employees; irate state citizens thus were not able to
hold those elected officials accountable. Yet Justice O'Connor saw
the requirement at issue in New York - that the states take title to
the waste - as an impairment of state sovereignty because state
officials would not be accountable to the citizens. 264 Such a narrow
view of accountability does not consider the ability of citizens to
affect national policy through voting for federal representatives and
could, therefore, effectively throttle many otherwise viable attempts
at cooperative federalism. 2611 The federal sphere should encompass
creative attempts at problem solving, such as the LLRWPAA's
take-title provision, even if the result is to impose restrictions on
state autonomy that might seem to implicate the Tenth
Amendment.
But if the provision is justifiable under the Commerce Clause, the
Tenth Amendment need not be implicated at all. In National
League of Cities v. Usery,266 the Supreme Court set out criteria by
which a state activity would be considered beyond the reach of federal regulation. 267 At issue in National League was whether Congress could, under the Commerce Clause, force the states to comply
with the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,268 areas that were considered "traditional governmental functions. "269 In enjoining enforcement of various provisions
of that act, the National League Court invoked the Tenth Amend262. [d.
263. [d.

264. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992).
265. See La Pierre, supra note 220, at 639-46.
266. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
267. National League. 426 U.S. at 842-46.
268. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.s.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
269. National League. 426 U.S. at 851-52. The court included' fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation as activities well within the arena of
functions traditionally performed by state and local" governments. [d. at 851 n.16.
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ment 270 and held that the act operated to "displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."271 The criteria outlined in National League,
however, look to the federal statute rather than state activity to define an unacceptable federal command and to elucidate protected
areas of state activity. The National League Court stated that a
statute is unacceptable if it regulates the "States as States,"272 if it
addresses a matter that is an "attribute of state sovereignty,"273 and
if compliance with it would impair a state's ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."274
The Court, however, did not explain what it meant by "States as
States," "attribute of state sovereignty," or "traditional governmental function." These phrases, though, would not remain vague for
long.
Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,276 the Court determined whether the Fair Labor Standards Act could be applied to a municipal mass-transit system. 278 In
upholding such an application, the Court overruled National League
because the distinctions that National League tried to draw between
the appropriate spheres of state and federal authority were so amorphous as to be "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."277
Although it was the product of a divided Court, Garcia remains the
Court's most definitive guide to analyzing at what point federal action impermissibly intrudes upon the states' sovereign sphere. The
Garcia Court rejected the notion that a priori definitions of state
sovereignty can be used to identify the scope of federal power under
the Commerce Clause,278 declaring that state sovereignty is "more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially-created limitations on
federal power."279
270. [d. at 842-43 (citing Fry v. United States. 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975» (arguing that
the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from acting in a way that inhibits the states' ability to
function effectively in the federal system).
271. [d. at 852.
272. [d. at 854.
273. [d. at 845.
274. [d. at 852.
275. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
276. [d. at 530.
277. [d. at 546.
278. [d. at 548.
279. [d. at 552.
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The Court began to flesh out what it meant by procedural safeguards three years later in South Carolina v. Baker,280 which dealt
with the constitutionality of sections of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA").281 Congress enacted
TEFRA to improve compliance with federal tax laws in an attempt
to reduce the federal deficit. Since unregistered bonds could be
bought, sold, and given as gifts without leaving a "paper trail,"282
Congress decided that all bonds, whether issued by states, the
United States, or private corporations, should be subject to a registration requirement. 283 South Carolina brought suit in the Supreme
Court, claiming that this provision was invalid under the Tenth
Amendment. 284 To analyze the provision under the Tenth Amendment, the Court treated it as if it "directly regulated States by
prohibiting outright the issuance of bearer bonds."2811 The Court restated Garcia's holding that the limits on federal authority over the
states are structural, rather than substantive: "States must find their
protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulatable
state activity."286 With regard to political process defects, the Court
pointed out that South Carolina did not allege that it was deprived
of a right to take part in the national political process. 287 Rather,
South Carolina argued that the process was flawed because the act
was passed "by an uninformed Congress relying upon incomplete
information."288 The Court responded that neither Garcia nor the
Tenth Amendment allows courts to "second-guess the substantive
basis for congressional legislation."289 It then concluded that since
the political process was not defective, the Tenth Amendment was
not implicated. 290
Although the New York Court found that the LLRWPAA's take280. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
281. [d. at 507 (citing § 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596 (repealed October 22, 1986».
282. Baker, 485 U.S. at 509.
283. [d. at 510.
284. [d.
285. [d. at 511.
286. [d. at 512 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537-54
(1985».
287. [d. at 513.
288. [d.
289. [d.
290. [d.
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title provision violated the Tenth Amendment, the Court did not analyze it under Garcia's rationale. 291 Had the Court relied on Garcia
in examining the issues presented in New York. it might have found
that the political process was not defective and that the Tenth
Amendment was thus not implicated. The Garcia Court pointedly
rejected the kind of a priori definitions on which the New York
Court facilely relied. 292 Justice O'Connor found the take-title provision unconstitutional because it took away a state government's accountability to its voters. To the extent that a law impedes a state
government's responsibility to represent and be accountable to the
citizens of the state, the law prevents the state from "functioning as
a sovereign."293 But the LLRWPAA need not be viewed as impeding a state government's responsibility and accountability. The
states fulfilled their responsibility to their citizens when, acting
through the NGA, they negotiated a state-created and state-implemented plan. 294 The accountability requirement was also satisfied
because the elected officials at the state level are the ones who decide how a state will approach problems of local, state, and national
ramifications, such as the disposal of nuclear waste. These officials
are directly accountable, of course, to their constituents during their
tenure in office. The NGA approached Congress with the concept of
a state-created disposal plan in response to an outcry that the states
wanted to implement local control. 2911 The NGA sought to meld
state consensus by holding more than a dozen different meetings,296
The LLRWPAA was based on a bill that" 'represent[ed] the diligent negotiating undertaken by' the National Governors' Association and 'embodied' the 'fundamentals of their settlement.' "297 The
291. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) (stating that Garcia is not
applicable if Congress has not subjected a state to the same legislation that applies to private
parties).
292. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1975).
293. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2429.
294. [d. at 2436 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
295. [d. (citing H. R. REP. No. 314, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 2, at 18-19 (1985), which
addresses South Carolina's announcement in 1979 regarding limits on the amount of waste it
would receive annually). See generally Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that a Washington statute which prohibited the
transportation and storage in the state of radioactive waste produced outside the state violated
both the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses). See a/so supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the Spellman decision). Local control also factored into the energy laws of California,
Illinois, and Minnesota.
296. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2437 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
297. [d. at 2437-38 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoted in 131 CONGo
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LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA are therefore examples of state governments holding themselves accountable to their voters, and not the
other way around.
Further, New York was one of the states that "worked through
their Governors to petition Congress for the 1980 and 1985
ActS."298 New York adhered to the Act and the Amendments by
entering into and withdrawing from compact negotiations,299 and in
passing a state law to site a state waste disposal facility.30o It had
actually selected five possible sites at the time it filed its lawsuit and
it continued to take full advantage of the LLRWPAA's time extension for sending waste to the three sited compacts. 30l In fact, Justice
White in his dissent considered that New York's actions bespoke
such a degree of approval of, cooperation with, and profit under the
Acts that New York should have been "estopped from asserting the
unconstitutionality of a provision that seeks merely to ensure that,
after deriving substantial advantages from the 1985 Act, New York
in fact must live up to its bargain by establishing an in-state lowlevel radioactive waste facility or assuming liability for its failure to
act."302 New York, however, did not allege any flaw in the political
process leading to the enactment of the LLRWPA or the
LLRWPAA.303 The Court's statement that the Amendments caused
state officials to "consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution"304 simply ignores the considerable procedural safeguards in place during the extensive negotiations leading to the LLRWPAA's passage.
Under Garcia, the LLRWPAA does not invade the states' sovereignty, but instead recognizes that sovereignty. New York did not
concern a circumstance in which Congress used the states as "implements of regulation."3o/) Rather, the situation was the converse:
the states, in an attempt to solve an intractable problem intimately
affecting each of them, struck a deal with Congress. The states
would set up the rules under which they wanted nuclear waste disREC. 35,204 (daily ed. Dec. 9,
298. [d. at 2439 (White, J.,
299. [d.
300. [d.
301. [d.
302. [d. at 2440 (White, J.,
303. [d. at 2439 (White, J.,
304. [d. at 2432.
305. [d. at 2420.

1985) (statement of Rep. Udall».
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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posal to be dealt with and then Congress would pass those rules,
initially as the LLRWPA and, five years later, as the LLRWPAA.
The federal goals of the Act and the Amendments were none other
than the states' goals, Although the take-title provision was not part
of the deal negotiated by the NGA,306 the NGA had "anticipated
that Congress might eventually have to take stronger steps to ensure
compliance with long-range planning deadlines, , .."307 Recognizing that the 1980 Act's fatal flaw was its lack of an ultimate sanction on noncomplying states, the Senate added the take-title provision 308 to make the state-initiated Amendments fully effective. 3oe
Viewing the take-title provision as Congress's commandeering 310 of
the states' legislative processes overlooks the history and purpose of
the original Act and the Amendments.
The sited states fought the characterization of the take-title provision as an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty by asking how a federal statute could be an impermissible encroachment
on state sovereignty when state officials had consented to its enactment. 811 Justice O'Connor found this to be a troubling question. 312
To answer it, she relied on a recent Supreme Court dissent stating
that "federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power."313 As Garcia pointed out, however,
the procedural safeguards woven into the fabric of the federal system ensure that the federal government does not infringe the liberties of citizens,314
In holding that the take-title provision invades the states' sphere
306. See id. at 2436 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
307. Id.
308. See 131 CONGo REC. SI8,I13 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Johnston) (stating that the take-title provision "insures that the' State will not be able to avoid the financial
consequences of failure to provide adequately for the disposal of its low-level radioactive waste").
309. H.R. REP. No. 314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 19 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3008.
310. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
311. Id. at 2431.
312. Id.
313. Id. (quoted in Coleman v. Thompson, IllS. Ct. 2546, 2570 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting». Justice O'Connor also guoted Gregory v. Ashcroft: "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate Branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation
of excessive power in anyone Branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Id. at 2431
(citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, IllS. Ct. 2395, 2400 (1991». Justice O'Connor then went on to say
that when Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, such behavior cannot be ratified by
the "consent" of state officials. Id.
314. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 529 (1985).
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of authority, the Court prophesied that similar departures from
traditional federal structure could be sought by either the federal or
state government because they might be in the personal interest of
both federal and state officials. 311l To illustrate this· point, the Court
posited a scenario: If a federal official could choose a disposal site or
could direct a state to make that choice, the federal official would
most likely have the state choose and thus avoid accountability to
the voters. If a state official could either select the dump site or let
the federal official choose, the state official would very likely prefer
that the federal official make the choice for the same reason. 3lB But
the Court did not conclude from its cynical hypothetical that this
would result in the absolute elimination of the voters' power to express their views about their elected officials through the ballot box.
Instead, the Court feebly concluded that where the "interests of
public officials thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority. . . federalism is hardly being
advanced. "317
If voter accountability is the sole criterion motivating the Court to
overturn the take-title provision, such accountability was inherent in
the development of the act from its inception. The states explicitly
sought a method through which they themselves could choose the
location of a disposal site, laying their elected officials open t9 voter
retribution. 3lB Federalism is hardly being advanced when a procedurally sound, state-created, and state-endorsed method to keep
states in control of a process of vital concern to them is truncated
because of the Court's own narrow view of accountability. Finally,
in light of the fact that the states would have to yield if Congress
chose to preempt the field,319 the states' ability to get Congress to do
what they want shows the "process" of federalism actively at work.
As the Garcia Court pointed out, "The political process ensures that
laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated."320 If
Congress had, indeed, preempted the field and tried to pass something like the Act and the Amendments without recognizing the autonomy the states demonstrated they were capable of exercising,
315. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2432.
316. Jd.
317. Jd.
318. See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text (outlining the role of the states in creating
the Original Act and its Amendments).
319. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
320. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (I985).
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passage of the legislation might well have been impossible or, at the
very least, slow and difficult. As it is, some states would have preferred that the LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA not be passed; those
states are the same ones that have been slow to act under the statute's mandates. 321 But there were no procedural flaws that justified
overturning the Act's key enforcement provision. Seen in light of the
statute's history and purpose, the LLRWPAA is not coercive; it
does not deny voters the chance to vote out of office those who developed it, and rather than intruding on state autonomy, it respects
that autonomy.
The New York Court held that the take-title provision was severable from the rest of the Amendments. 322 In the Court's view, the
take-title provision could be severed "without doing violence to the
rest of the Act."323 The Act would still be "operative" and would
still serve "Congress' objective of encouraging the States to attain
local or regional self-sufficiency in the disposal of low level radioactive waste."324 The Court stated that the Act still included "two incentives that coax the States along this road."3211 The Court pointed
out that if waste generators in a noncomplying state cannot obtain
access to other states' disposal sites, the generators may well exert
pressure on their own recalcitrant state to comply with the Original
Act and Amendments, even without the state being forced to take
title. 326 Specifically with regard to New York, the Court pointed out
that the "sited regional compacts need not accept New York's waste
after the seven-year transition period expires . . . ."327 Practically,
this means that New York may continue to export its waste until
1996. 328 By then it must have arrangements in place for shipping its
waste to an out-of-state depository or it must have already opened
its own waste dump, available for use by both New York's as well
as out-of-state waste producers. 329
321. See supra notes 155-80 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan's ouster from the
Midwest Compact).
322. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
323. [d.
324. [d.
325. [d. The Court took the teeth out of the LLRWPAA; without the take-title provision, the
Amendments are not much more effective than the 1980 Act they replaced.
326. [d.
327. [d.
328.42 U.S.c. § 202Ie(d)(2)(C) (1988).
329. See supra note 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages of opening a
dump when a state is not a member of a compact).
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While the New York Court spoke in general terms about the severability of the take-title provision, according to Justice Stevens's
dissent, the provision "remains enforceable against the 44 States
that have joined interstate compacts . . . because the compacting
States have, in their agreements, embraced that provision and given
it independent effect."33o Thus the practical effect of this case is
limited to those states. that were not members of compacts at the
time of the decision. 331
V.

CONCLUSION

The LLRWPAAwas the second piece of federal legislation dealing with the ubiquitous problem of low-level nuclear waste disposal.
Congress had to amend the original 1980 Act to give it more effective authority. Under this enhanced authority, the states proceeded
more or less in st ep 332 with the Amendments' modified schedule until the Supreme Court invalidated one of the key provisions in New
York. 333 The Court struck down the take-title provision, under
which states that did not meet the statute's time frame for waste
disposal provisions would have to take title to and responsibility for
the waste generated within their borders. The Court found that the
take-title provision was an impermissible command to state governments to regulate according to the dictates of Congress. The Court
did not analyze the case under prevailing Tenth Amendment precedent such as Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.334 If it had done so, the Court might have found the provision to
be a viable example of cooperative federalism. Although the Court
intended to protect New York from federal legislation that would
impair its sovereignty, it completely overlooked the procedural safeguards required by Garcia, safeguards that were in place during the
development of the Amendments. In striking down the take-title
provision, the Court removed the strongest incentive for states to
cooperate with the LLRWPAA.
Nonconstitutional challenges to the Act, such as the steps Michi330. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2447 n.3 (Stevens. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
331. New York could try to negotiate space in another state's or compact's dump, or it could
follow Texas's lead and arrange to sell space in its own dump to a state with smaller waste
volumes. See supra note 148 (discussing Texas's dealings with the New England states).
332. But see supra notes 155-80 and accompanying text (describing the actions of Michigan
which eventually led to its removal from the Midwest Compact).
333. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
334. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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gan took prior to its ouster from the Midwest Compact, suggest
some procedural responses Congress could make. For example, Congress could attempt to cap the restrictiveness of state site selection
criteria. At some trigger point, a waffling host state that finally
withdraws from a compact might be made to pay the added
surcharges the other states incur as a result of their reliance on the
host state to locate a site.
New York's constitutional challenge also suggests some possible
legislative responses. Justice White, in his dissent in New York, outlined three possibilities. First, Congress could authorize the taketitle provision under the Spending Clause by making a state's willingness to take title a condition for receiving its share of collected
surcharge monies. 3M Secondly, if a state does not either establish a
dump for its wastes or negotiate space in some other state's or compact's dump by the statute's deadline, Congress could directly regulate that state's nuclear waste producers pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power. 336 Finally, White noted that Congress could create a
right in the generators to sue state officials for failing to establish
the disposal options provided for in federal-state programs. 337
Whatever response Congress chooses to make with regard to the
New York decision, the LLRWPAA's legality in areas except the
take-title provision has been established. The states fought hard to
make disposing of low-level nuclear waste their responsibility and
the take-title provision grew directly out of that fight. Subject to all
the customary procedural safeguards in place during its enactment,
the take-title provision could have been found to be a legitimate exercise in cooperative federalism, notwithstanding Tenth Amendment
review. Even though the Court held that the take-title provision was
unconstitutional with regard to New York, states already in compacts remain bound by all the LLRWPAA's provisions. While it is
probable that no state really wants to begin operating a nuclear
waste disposal facility, the states already committed to compacts are
making progress in meeting the LLRWPAA's goals. The take-title
provision is the bite behind the LLRWPAA's bark. Nipped into action by that provision as they are, compacting states probably find
compliance with the time frames less painful than might be anticipated because they participated in the drafting of the LLRWPAA,
335. [d. at 2445 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
336. [d.
337. [d. at 2445-46 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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from its conception through its realization. Despite the New York
decision, the state-based and state-created LLRWPAA remains a
viable demonstration of federalism.

